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SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
This survey provides brief digests of cases that represent a variety
of aspects of international law that have appeared in the Courts of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit and D.C. Circuit, and the appellate courts
of Maryland, the District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina and the Court of International Trade. The
cases are grouped in topical categories and references are given for fur-
ther research.
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I. CRIMINAL
As WHEN ENTERING THE UNITED STATES, THE BORDER SEARCH Ex-
CEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLIES TO PERSONS AND EF-
FECTS LEAVING THE UNITED STATES. United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d
1290 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 400 (1995).
Appellant, Daniel Oriakhi (Oriakhi), was indicted by a grand jury
in the District of Maryland for possessing heroin with the intent to
distribute, and for participating in a conspiracy to distribute heroin.
During Oriakhi's trial the United States introduced evidence seized in
two separate warrantless searches conducted by U.S. Customs officials.
The first search was made pursuant to the practice of U.S. Customs
Inspectors to examine "unusual shipments," including shipments bound
for narcotics source countries or countries which are subject to em-
bargo and shipments accompanied by suspicious or incomplete
paperwork. This search was effected upon the contents of a 40-foot
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container being shipped from Port Elizabeth, New Jersey to Lagos, Ni-
geria by the "Agoda Smith Company." "Agoda Smith" was an alias
employed by Oriakhi. Some of the contents of this container were sub-
sequently used as evidence by the United States in Oriakhi's trial. The
second search at issue was effected at New York City's J.F.K. Airport
upon Oriakhi's luggage, which was revealed by x-ray examination to
contain two 9mm semi-automatic handguns and ten boxes of ammuni-
tion. Upon manual inspection of the luggage's contents, Customs in-
spectors also found $10,000 in U.S. currency which Oriakhi had not
reported to Customs as he was required to do under federal currency
reporting laws.
Motions to suppress evidence filed by Oriakhi were denied by the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Oriakhi ar-
gued on appeal to the Fourth Circuit that the two searches violated his
Fourth Amendment rights because they were conducted without proba-
ble cause or even reasonable suspicion. Although Oriakhi did not dis-
pute that the Port Elizabeth and J.F.K. searches were conducted at the
functional equivalent of the United States border1 and that routine
searches of persons and effects entering the country may be conducted
at the border without a warrant, probable cause, or any level of individ-
ualized suspicion, he contended that this border search exception to the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to persons and effects leaving the
country.
Held: Affirmed. Although the principle case articulating the bor-
der exception, United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977), involved
the searching of mail entering the United States which was used to
import heroin, the Fourth Circuit held that the principles articulated in
Ramsey also apply to the sovereign interest of protecting and monitor-
ing exports from the country. The Court joined the several other circuit
courts which have held that the Ramsey border search exception ex-
tends to all routine searches at the nation's borders, irrespective of
whether persons or effects are entering or exiting the country.2 Both
searches of Oriakhi's effects began as routine border searches, and were
expanded only as further information developed. Thus, both fell within
the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment. Significance:
1. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 41 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973).
2. See United States v. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d 136, 143 (3rd Cir. 1991); United
States v. Hernandez-Salazar, 813 F.2d 1126, 1137 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Udofot, 711 F.2d
831, 839-40 (8th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 896 (1983); United States v.
Ajilouny, 629 F.2d 830, 834 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981); as
cited in Oriakhi, 57 F.3d at 1296 n.3.
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The Fourth Circuit joins five other circuits in holding the border search
exception to the Fourth Amendment equally applicable to persons and
effects leaving the United States as well as entering.
II. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY, AS AFFORDED BY THE VIENNA CONVENTION
ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, PROTECTS FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC PERSON-
NEL STATIONED IN THE UNITED STATES FROM A CIVIL LAWSUIT
BROUGHT BY THEIR DOMESTIC SERVANT. Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535
(4th Cir. 1996).
Appellant, Corazon Tabion (Tabion), a Philippine national, per-
formed domestic services in the home of Appellees Faris and Lana
Mufti (Mufti) for more than two years. Because Tabion believed that
her low pay and long hours violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 201 et. seq., she instituted suit against the Muftis in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The
District Court found that the Muftis were protected by diplomatic im-
munity. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18,
1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, provides nearly absolute civil
and criminal immunity for diplomatic personnel stationed in foreign
countries.' The Muftis are covered by the Vienna Convention because
of Mr. Mufti's position as First Secretary, and later Counsellor, of the
Jordanian Embassy in Washington, D.C.
In a case of first impression, the Court determined that the phrase
"commercial activity" as used in one of the three exceptions to diplo-
matic immunity enumerated in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
did not cover the Muftis' employment relationship with Tabion. The
Court ruled the suit barred by the Vienna Convention. Tabion appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, arguing
that her domestic service for the Muftis amounted to commercial activ-
ity exercised outside the Muftis' official function. Held: Affirmed. The
phrase "commercial activity" as it appears in Article 31(1)(c), which
states an exception to diplomatic immunity from actions "relating to
any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic
agent in the receiving State outside his official functions," was not in-
1. "The Vienna Convention became applicable to the United States by the Diplo-
matic Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 251-59, which repealed earlier laws governing dip-
lomatic immunity. Both the United States and Jordan, as well as nearly 150 other
countries, have signed the treaty." Tabion, 73 F.3d at 535 n.1.
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tended by the signatories to the Vienna Convention to include day-to-
day living services such as domestic help. Because such a service is
incidental to daily life, diplomats are to be immune from disputes aris-
ing out of them. Significance: In keeping with the tradition of ex-
tremely expansive diplomatic immunity, American citizens having pri-
vate disputes with foreign diplomats which do not implicate the
diplomat in having engaged in commercial activities are without legal
recourse.
III. FAMILY LAW
PAKISTANI CHILD CUSTODY ORDER Is GRANTED COMITY ABSENT Ap-
PELLANT'S ABILITY TO PROVE THAT PAKISTANI LAW IS SO CONTRARY
TO MARYLAND PUBLIC POLICY AS TO UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE IN THE
OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL. Hosain v. Malik, en banc, 108 Md. App. 284
(1995).
Appellant Joohi Q. Hosain appeals a trial court's ruling which up-
held a Pakistani child custody order for Appellee Anwar Malik, her ex-
husband.1 Hosain and her daughter fled Pakistan some years ago. Ms.
Hosain and her child settled in Baltimore. Malik remained in Pakistan
and obtained a Pakistani court order granting him custody of their
child. Malik then sought to enforce the Pakistani order in Maryland.
The trial court upheld this order, ruling that it could be legally en-
forced in Maryland. Hosain appealed.
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, Held.-
Affirmed. Appellant did not prove that Pakistani child custody laws are
not in substantial conformity with Maryland child custody laws.
Both Hosain and Malik, at the trial court, presented expert evi-
dence on Pakistani law. Hosain's expert characterized the child custody
proceedings in Pakistan as "one-sided" because the Pakistani court
never considered Hosain's side of the story in making its determina-
tions. Malik's expert, however, pointed out that Hosain chose not to
attend the proceedings in Pakistan, and had she done so she would have
been afforded a fair opportunity to present evidence for her case. Addi-
tionally, Malik's expert discussed the "welfare of the child" standard
employed in Pakistan child custody proceedings. This standard consid-
ers the age and sex of the child, the child's religion, and the child's
1. On remand from Malik v. Malik, 99 Md. App. 521 (1994) (reviewed in last
year's issue, 19 Md. J. Int'l L. & Trade 168 (1995)), the Circuit Court issued a written
Order on December 12, 1994 granting Mr. Malik custody of their child.
SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
relationship with the proposed custodian. The trial court found that this
standard was similar to the "best interest of the child" standard em-
ployed in Maryland child custody proceedings. Consequently, the trial
court found that the Pakistani court order should be granted comity in
Maryland.
The Court of Special Appeals agreed with the trial court's deter-
minations. The Court found that Hosain was not successful in overcom-
ing the trial court's ruling with a "preponderance of evidence" showing
that the custody determination standard in Pakistan is grossly out-of-
line with the standard employed in Maryland custody proceedings. The
Court ruled that the Pakistani order is valid and that Pakistan was the
best forum in which to make a custody decision. Significance: A foreign
custody order will be granted comity in Maryland unless the appellant
can prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the foreign jurisdic-
tion's custody determination standard is significantly incompatible with
Maryland's custody determination standard.
IV. IMMIGRATION
ALIENS OPERATING FROM A FOREIGN OWNED BARGE ON THE OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF WHO CONSTRUCT PLATFORMS FOR DOMESTIC
OIL COMPANIES ARE NOT SUBJECT TO UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION
LAWS. United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the
Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry v. Reno, 73 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
In 1989, Heerema Marine Corporation, S.A., a Dutch-owned com-
pany, contracted to perform work for Exxon. The site of the work was
the outer Continental Shelf off the coast of Santa Barbara, California.
Heerema installed the foundations for oil platforms. These foundations
were hauled to the installation site by barge, and then attached to the
ocean floor. The alien laborers working for Heerema did not comply
with United States immigration law.
United States labor unions brought suit against the Attorney Gen-
eral seeking to enforce United States immigration laws against the
alien workers. The District Court for the District of Columbia origi-
nally granted summary judgment in favor of the unions. Upon appeal,
the Circuit Court vacated and remanded. The District Court then dis-
missed, and the unions brought this appeal.
The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia Circuit Held: Af-
firmed. The alien workers were not subject to United States immigra-
tion law. Although 43 U.S.C. § 1331 requires aliens working on the
Outer Continental shelf to comply with immigration laws, these work-
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ers fell within 43 U.S.C. § 1356's statutory exception for vessels, rigs
and platforms of which a majority interest is owned by citizens of a
foreign nation. Significance: This decision provides a basis for foreign-
owned companies to employ alien workers on projects on the outer
Continental Shelf without the burden of compliance with United States
immigration law.
CITIZENS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA SEEKING STATUS AD-
JUSTMENT UNDER THE CHINESE STUDENT PROTECTION ACT MUST
ALSO MEET THE REQUIREMENT SET FORTH IN SECTION 245 OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT. Qi-Zhuo v. Meissner, 70 F.3d
136 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Appellant Lin Qi-Zhuo, a Chinese national, applied for an adjust-
ment of his immigration status to that of a permanent resident under
the Chinese Student Protection Act (CSPA). Although Qi-Zhuo met
the status adjustment requirements of the CSPA, Qi-Zhuo failed to
meet the basic Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) require-
ment because he entered the United States illegally in 1987. The INA
only provides status adjustments to non-immigrants who have "been
inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States." 8 USC
§1255(a); §245(a) INA. Qi-Zhuo brought suit alleging the CSPA ex-
empts Chinese nationals from the INA's inspection requirement.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia de-
nied Appellant's plea for declaratory judgment. On appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit Held: Affirmed.
The Court found the statutory language of the CSPA did not exclude
the application of section 245 of INA to Chinese nationals seeking ad-
justment status under CSPA. First, principles of statutory construction
require that items not present in a list of exclusions are not to be pre-
sumed excluded. Thus, the Court could not read into the statute an
exemption that Congress had not included. Second, since legislative in-
tent was unclear and inconclusive it could not override the plain lan-
guage of the statute. Finally, the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice, the administrative agency responsible for the enforcement of both
statutes, previously had concluded that Chinese status adjustment ap-
plicants under CSPA must meet all the requirements of section 245 of
the INA at 8 C.F.R. § 245.9(b)(6). Significance: Nationals of the Peo-
ples Republic of China who attempt to adjust their residency status
under the CSPA must have entered the United States legally.
ALIENS WHO HAVE BEEN CONVICTED OF AN AGGRAVATED FELONY
ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A SEPARATE DETERMINATION OF DANGEROUS-
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NESS BEFORE BEING DEPORTED UNDER 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (H)(2)(B).
Kofa v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 60 F.3d 1084
(4th Cir. 1995).
Petitioner Kofa had two aggravated felony convictions for posses-
sion of cocaine with an intent to distribute. The Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service (INS) issued an order to show cause as to why Kofa
should not be deported. The Immigration Judge stated that despite
these convictions Kofa could apply for a withholding of deportation if
he could prove the he was not a danger to the U.S. and later deter-
mined that Kofa, in fact, did not present a danger. The INS filed an
interlocutory appeal, taking the position that since Kofa had been con-
victed of a serious crime, he was statutorily ineligible to apply for such
a withholding. The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed and re-
manded the case whereby Kofa was ordered deported. Kofa petitioned
for judicial review. The only issue before the Court was whether 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B) requires a separate determination of danger-
ousness to the community when an alien has been convicted of an ag-
gravated felony. On petition to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, Held: Denied.
Following the rules of statutory construction, the Court found that
the meaning of the statute was plain and agreed with INS that once an
alien has been convicted of a particularly serious crime, that alien is
ineligible for withholding without a separate finding on dangerousness.
The Court therefore denied the Petitioner's request for review in each
case. In addition, the statutory section in question was identical to the
language in the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Ref-
ugees that also refused to allow a refugee who was a danger to the host
country to remain. Interpreting the United Nations Protocol, the Court
clearly concluded that when an individual is convicted of an especially
dangerous crime, that person is necessarily a danger to the community.
The Court's interpretation reinforces the U.S. government's power
to deport any individual who presents a danger to the community based
upon a conviction for a particularly serious crime. Such a position
seems to be in keeping with the norms set by the international commu-
nity. Significance: The Fourth Circuit becomes the sixth circuit to
agree that a conviction of a serious crime does not require an additional
finding of dangerousness before deportation.
V. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMMERCIAL LAW
NATIVE AMERICAN NATION NOT FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED AND NOT
DEMONSTRATING INJURY IN FACT LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE
1996]
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GATT. Cook v. United States Senate, Nos.
95-01-00001, Slip Op. 96-34, 1996 WL 61641 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996).
In this action for declaratory judgment in the United States Court
of International Trade, Plaintiff Dale F. Cook, Sr., as Chief of "The
Original Cherokee Nation," sought a ruling on the constitutionality of
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act and the passage of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Claiming unspecified injury
to "The Original Cherokee Nation and its citizens and inhabitants,"
Plaintiff made two arguments in support of his prayer for declaratory
relief. First, he argued that the people of his nation were denied due
process because the volume and complexity of the GATT document
prohibited them from adequately informing their representatives how
to vote at the time it was passed. Second, he argued that the GATT
itself violates the Commerce Clause of the Constitution because it in-
terferes with the trade relationship between the United States and the
Native American nations as established by the Hopewell Treaty. As an
alternative to declaratory judgment, Plaintiff petitioned for dissolution
of the United States and return of all land acquired under the
Hopewell Treaty to the original American Indian nations who occupied
it.
On Petition to the United States Court of International Trade
Held: Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Standing Granted.
In a memorandum opinion, the Court ruled on motions to dismiss filed
by several Defendants against whom Cook complained.
After determining that the Plaintiff failed to establish an "injury
in fact" as required for jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitu-
tion, the Court found that he lacked standing to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the GATT. Even if the court had found the GATT uncon-
stitutional, it noted that the Plaintiff still could not establish that he
had been harmed by its passage. "The Original Cherokee Nation" was
not among the Hopewell Treaty signatories, and its current Chief is not
counted among any federally-recognized tribes using the Cherokee
name. Finally, the Court found the Plaintiff lacked standing under the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which limits private remedies solely
to actions brought by the United States. The Defendants' motions were
granted, and Plaintiff's action was dismissed.
While the Court interpreted subsection 3512(c)(2) of GATT as
annulling Plaintiff's action against the Defendant States, it reserved
judgment on the question of whether the Act's provisions with regard
to standing precluded constitutional attack across the board. Signifi-
cance: Parties who fail to establish standing under Article III of the
Constitution or the statutory provisions of the GATT may not bring
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actions to challenge its constitutionality.
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN FOR CERTAIN TEXTILE PRODUCTS To BE DE-
TERMINED By ORIGIN OF FABRIC USED To CREATE THE PRODUCTS.
Pac Fung Feather Co., Ltd. v. United States, No. 95-10-01299, 1995
WL 767350 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995).
This matter came before the Court of International Trade on the
parties' cross motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff had challenged
the final regulations promulgated by the United States Customs Ser-
vice (Customs) concerning the rules of origin for textile and apparel
products. Held. Denied, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment;
Granted, defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment.
Principles for determining the origin of textile and apparel prod-
ucts were set forth in section 334(b) of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments Act (URAA), 19 U.S.C.S. § 3592 (1995).' These principles,
simplified and paraphrased, are as follows:
334(b)(1): A textile or apparel item originates in Country
"X" if
(A):the item is wholly obtained or produced in X
(B):the item is yarn, thread, etc. and
(i): the constituent fibers are spun in X or
(ii): the filament is extruded in X
(C):the item is fabric, and the constituent fibers are trans-
formed by a fabric-making process in X
(D):the item is any other textile or apparel product wholly
assembled in X from its component pieces.
334(b)(2): Special Rule:
(A):The origin of goods under certain tariff headings and
subheadings shall be determined by using (b)(1)(A) or
(b)(1)(B) or (b)(1)(C), "as appropriate."
334(b)(3): Multicountry Rule:
If the origin cannot be determined by using (b)(1) or
(b)(2), then the item originates in
(A):the country in which the most important assembly or
2. Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). President Clinton signed the
URAA into law on December 8, 1994. Pac Fung, 1995 WL 767350 at *1.
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manufacturing occurs, or
(B):if the origin cannot be determined from (b)(3)(A),
then the item originates in the last country in which important
assembly or manufacturing occurs.
On May 23, 1995, Customs published a notice of proposed regula-
tions to implement these principles. In that notice, Customs noted that
the "as appropriate" phrase in section 334(b)(2)(A) had caused some
confusion. Customs had received comments suggesting that if a Special
Rule product is not a fabric, it would not be "appropriate" to deter-
mine its origin by referring to (b)(1)(C), as the Special Rule requires,
because (b)(1)(C) on its face covers only fabric. Customs rejected this
interpretation because it would render the (b)(2) Special Rule a nul-
lity, since none of the Special Rule products were fabrics. Rather, these
products had all "been advanced beyond the form of ... yarn, thread,
etc., or fabric."3
Customs maintained this interpretation in the face of further chal-
lenges, and in its final regulations, published on September 5, 1995, it
enumerated specific requirements for determining the origin of the Spe-
cial Rule goods. One of these requirements ordered that "[t]he country
of origin of a good classifiable under the headings 6301 through 6306 is
the country . . . in which the fabric comprising the good was formed by
a fabric-making process.""
It was this order that gave rise to the complaint of Pac Fung
Feather Co., Ltd. (Pac Fung) that Customs' regulations were "arbi-
trary, capricious, and otherwise not in accordance with law."" Pac
Fung is a Hong Kong company that manufactures home textile arti-
cles, e.g. bedsheets, pillowcases, duvet covers, all of which are Special
Rule products. Pac Fung manufactures these items in Hong Kong, Ma-
cau, and the People's Republic of China; however, the fabric used to
manufacture the items is woven primarily in China. Thus, under Cus-
toms' new rule, all of Pac Fung's products manufactured in Hong Kong
and Macau would be deemed to originate not in those areas, but in
China. This in turn meant that Pac Fung's exports of the items would
be subject to the quantitative restrictions imposed by the United States
on textile exports from China.
3. Pac Fung, 1995 WL 767350 at *2.
4. Id. This regulation covered the following Special Rule goods: blankets; travel-
ing rugs; bed, table, toilet and kitchen linens; curtains and interior blinds; curtain va-
lances; sacks and bags used for packing goods; tarpaulins, awnings, and sunblinds;
tents; sails; and other furnishing articles. Id. at *8, n.l.
5. Id. at *3.
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Customs had moved to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, arguing
that Pac Fung had failed to follow the procedures required by 28
U.S.C. § 1581(i). Customs had also challenged Pac Fung's standing on
the grounds that Pac Fung had not demonstrated any actual or immi-
nent injury. The Court denied both motions and then moved on to the
merits. Pac Fung argued that the words "as appropriate" in Special
Rule (b)(2) meant that the origin of a Special Rule product should be
determined by using (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B) or (b)(1)(C) only if the
product fit within the literal terms of those provisions (i.e. if the prod-
uct was "wholly obtained/produced" or was "yarn, thread, etc." or was
"fabric.") If the Special Rule product did not fit within those literal
terms, then its country of origin should be determined by resorting to
(b)(3), the Multicountry Rule.
The Court disagreed, saying that Pac Fung's interpretation vio-
lated the general principle that a statute should not be interpreted in a
manner that renders other parts of the same statute inoperative. The
Court reasoned that if a Special Rule product has to fit literally within
the (b)(1)(B) or (b)(1)(C) terms, as Pac Fung insisted, then that prod-
uct's origin could be determined by simply resorting to (B) or (C) in
the first place, thus eliminating any need for the Special Rule provi-
sions and rendering them superfluous. (This was essentially the same
rationale that Customs had offered in its notice of proposed regulations
of May 23, 1995.)
Pac Fung argued that it was Customs' interpretation that caused
an irrelevance problem, because if a "Special Rule" product's origin is
determined by the origin of the yarns or fabrics that comprise the prod-
uct, then virtually none of the Special Rule products would ever be
considered under the 334(b)(3) Multicountry Rule, thus rendering that
provision superfluous. Customs countered that in fact the Multicountry
Rule would be applied, for instance, when a Special Rule product is
made from several fabrics that originate in different countries. The
Court rejected Pac Fung's attack and accepted Customs' construction
of the Multicountry Rule. The Court went on to hold that the only
reasonable construction of the statute is that it requires the origin of
Special Rule products to be determined by (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), or
(b)(1)(C), whichever is most appropriate to that product. Significance:
The country of origin of a great variety of common furnishing-related
textile articles will now be determined not by the country in which
those articles were manufactured, but by the country in which the
fabric comprising those articles was manufactured.
A REDUCTION IN DUTIABLE VALUE FOR MERCHANDISE CONTAINING
LATENT DEFECTS CAN BE AUTHORIZED ONLY WHEN THE MERCHAN-
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DISE IS OF LESSER QUALITY THAN THAT FOR WHICH THE IMPORTER
CONTRACTED; ALSO, POST-IMPORTATION MAINTENANCE COSTS MUST
BE SEPARATELY IDENTIFIED TO CUSTOMS PRIOR TO IMPORTATION IN
ORDER TO DEDUCT THEM FROM THE ITEM'S DUTIABLE VALUE. Sam-
sung Electronics America, Inc. v. United States, No. 91-04-00288,
1995 WL 631789 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995).
This matter came before the Court of International Trade on the
parties' cross motions for summary judgment concerning plaintiff's
challenge to the appraisal by the United States Customs Service (Cus-
toms) of the value of certain imported articles. Held: Denied, plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment; Granted, defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment.
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. (Samsung Korea) sold various elec-
tronic products to Samsung Electronics America, Inc. (Samsung
America) for importation into the United States. As part of the sales
contracts, Samsung Korea and Samsung America entered into Servic-
ing Agent Agreements (Agreements). Pursuant to the Agreements,
Samsung Korea agreed to reimburse Samsung America for any inspec-
tions, repairs, or refurbishings performed by Samsung America on the
imported products. From 1987 to 1990, Samsung America claimed that
approximately 4.7 per cent of the products contained latent manufac-
turing defects that were detected after importation. Samsung America
either sold those articles "as is" at a discount or repaired them. Then,
in accordance with the Agreements, Samsung Korea reimbursed Sam-
sung America for the costs of the profit losses and repairs on those
items.
Customs assessed duties on all the electronic articles based upon
their transactional value; that is, by using the price Samsung America
actually paid when it purchased the items from Samsung Korea. Sam-
sung America contended that Customs should have reduced the value
of those goods that were defective prior to assessing duties, and offered
two arguments in support.
Samsung America first argued that 19 C.F.R. § 158.12 (1990)
authorizes a reduction in value for items that contain latent defects
when they enter the United States. Customs in response argued that
this regulation applies only when an importer receives merchandise that
is of lesser quality than that for which it contracted. The court noted
that since Customs' interpretation of its own regulation in this case was
reasonable, such interpretation was entitled to judicial deference. Hav-
ing thus accepted Customs' interpretation, the court then went on to
apply that interpretation to this dispute. The court pointed out that
Samsung America had not contracted to import only defect-free arti-
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cles: Samsung America had acknowledged in the Agreements that
some of the articles would contain defects that would require repair by
Samsung America, at Samsung Korea's expense. In the court's words,
Samsung America had contracted to receive both "(1) defect-free mer-
chandise; and (2) defective merchandise for which it had a contractual
right to compensation for loss or repair."' Thus, the court concluded
that in receiving the defective goods, Samsung America received noth-
ing less than that for which it had contracted, and that therefore 19
C.F.R. § 158.12 did not entitle Samsung America to a reduced valua-
tion of the articles.
Samsung America next turned to 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(3)(A)(i)
and argued that the statute authorizes Customs to deduct from the
transaction value of an article the cost of its post-importation mainte-
nance.2 The court decided that the statute applied only in those situa-
tions in which the importer, as part of the sales contract, has incurred
post-importation maintenance costs in advance and has separated those
maintenance costs from the price of the item. This separate identifica-
tion allows Customs, when the item is imported, to exclude the pre-paid
maintenance costs from its valuation of the item. Here, Samsung
America did not incur (and thus did not identify) the post-importation
maintenance costs when it bought the items; rather, Samsung America
admitted that it did not incur the repair costs until after the items had
been imported. The court therefore held that the statute's provisions
were inapplicable to Samsung America in this case. Significance: A re-
duction in dutiable value for merchandise containing latent defects can
be authorized only when the defective merchandise is of lesser quality
than that for which the importer contracted; also, post-importation
maintenance costs on imported items must be separately identified to
Customs prior to importation; otherwise, such costs will not be de-
ducted from Customs' duty assessment of the imported item.
WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ACT'S HARBOR MAINTENANCE TAX
REPRESENTS A TAX As APPLIED TO EXPORTS THAT Is PROHIBITED BY
THE EXPORT CLAUSE. United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 907
F.Supp. 408 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995).
United States Shoe Corporation paid a tax, as mandated by the
1. Id. at "2.
2. Samsung America contended that its costs to repair the latent defects consti-
tuted such maintenance; Customs disagreed. The court did not reach this issue, decid-
ing that, in any event, the statute did not apply to Samsung America's situation. Id. at
*3, and n.1.
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Water Resources Development Act of 1986, on articles it exported
from April through June, 1994. The tax imposed an ad valorem tax on
"any port use" of federally-maintained navigable waterways.1 United
States Shoe Co. brought suit against the United States for recovery of
the tax monies paid, claiming imposition of the tax violated the Export
Clause.' The United States argued that the Tax is a valid exercise of
Congress's constitutional authority to regulate foreign and interstate
commerce and did not implicate its taxing powers. The United States
further argued that even though the Export Clause restrains those pow-
ers, it cannot circumscribe Congress's unlimited capacity to regulate
commerce.
In the Court of International Trade, the Court Held: Affirmed.
The Harbor Maintenance Tax as it applies to exports constitutes a tax
prohibited by the Export Clause and does not come under Congress's
Commerce Clause authority. The power to regulate commerce does not
restrain the Export Clause. Although Congress can adopt methods it
deems necessary to accomplish its goals pursuant to the regulation of
commerce, this authority is limited by other provisions of the Constitu-
tion.3 The Court further explained that even if it found the tax to be a
fee imposed under the commerce power, the fee is still subject to the
restrictions of the Export Clause if it actually represents a tax or duty.
Even if there was a charge upon exports imposed under the Commerce
Clause as a user fee, or to regulate commerce, it would not be immune
from the restrictions of the Export Clause if the court found the fee to
be a tax or duty on exports. The Court's primary concern is what the
fee actually represents, not what it is termed. Significance: This deci-
sion reaffirms the notion that the Congress's use of the Commerce
Clause is not unlimited to the point where it offends other aspects of
the Constitution. Further, the Court will view a tax on exports by any
other name as a tax, prohibited by the Export Clause.
VIRGINIA'S CHOICE OF LAW REQUIRES THAT THE LAW OF THE PLACE
OF PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT BE APPLIED TO RESOLVE A
1. 26 U.S.C.§§ 4461, 4462(a)(1) and (2). The statute defines "port use" as "the
loading [and] unloading of commercial cargo [on or] from[ a commercial vessel at a
port. A port is defined as any channel or harbor open to public navigation that is not an
inland waterway.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. The Export Clause provides "[n]o Tax or Duty
shall be laid on Articles exported from any State."
3. United States v. Lopez, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1627, 131 L.Ed.2d 626
(1995) (The commerce power "is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution"
(quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U:S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824)).
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BREACH OF CONTRACT DISPUTE. Ali v. Al-Faisal, 73 F.3d 356, 1995
WL 761102 (4th Cir. 1995).
Prince Khaled Bin Fahd Al-Faisal (Al-Faisal), a Saudi Arabian
citizen, was granted summary judgment in a breach of contract claim
and Ifan Ali, a United States citizen, appeals. Ali asserted that Al-
Faisal had agreed to finance the opening of a McDonalds franchise in
Saudi Arabia if Ali did the administrative work. According to Ali, the
profits were to be shared equally. Al-Faisal moved for summary judg-
ment on many grounds including that the contract was illegal in Saudi
Arabia.1
In the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, the Court
Held: Affirmed. In granting summary judgment, the court views the
non-moving party in the most favorable light. In this case, the Court
assumed there was a valid contract, and looked to Virginia's choice of
law principles2 to see whether Virginia or Saudi Arabian law should
apply to this contract dispute. Virginia's choice of law requires that the
law of the place of performance of the contract be applied to resolve a
breach of contract dispute. Since the place of performance is Saudi
Arabia, Saudi Arabian law applies. Saudi Arabian law makes it illegal
for a non-Saudi Arabian to own any part of a Saudi Arabian business3
so the contract at its inception is illegal and therefore there can be no
breach. Significance: Without any provision to the contrary, a breach
of contract dispute in Virginia will be settled by applying the law of the
place of performance.
LAW OF THE FORUM DETERMINES MATTERS RELATING TO SERVICE OF
PROCESS ON FOREIGN CORPORATIONS. Holman v. Warwick Furnace
Company, 456 S.E.2d 894 (S.C. 1995).
On April 15, 1985, plaintiffs were injured in an explosion in Gas-
ton, South Carolina. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 15-9-245, they ini-
tiated suit against MAERZ Ofenbau AG, a Swiss corporation, on
April 2, 1991 by delivering copies of their Summons and Complaint
1. Al-Faisal also moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the contract
was speculative, void for vagueness, and in violation of the Statute of Frauds. Since the
Court found the contract to be illegal, there was no need to address these issues.
2. Since this is a diversity suit filed in federal court, the court must look to the
choice of law of the forum. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (cited in Ali v.
Al-Faisal, 73 F.3d 356, 1995 WL 761102 at *3 (4th Cir. 1995)).
3. BUSINESS LAWS OF SAUDI ARABIA (Nicole Karam ed., 1994) (cited in
Ali v. Al-Faisal, 73 F.3d 356, 1995 WL 761102 at *4 (4th Cir. 1995)).
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(S&C) to the Secretary of State for South Carolina.1 In turn, the Sec-
retary of State mailed the S&C to MAERZ on April 8, 1991.
MAERZ received the S&C on April 16, 1991. The statute of limita-
tions on their claims expired on April 15, 1991. The first question
presented to the court was whether service was effective upon a) deliv-
ery of the summons and complaint to the Secretary of State; or b)
receipt by MAERZ.
Additionally, in accord with Swiss law, plaintiffs initiated service
pursuant to letters rogatory on March 29, 1991 which MAERZ re-
ceived on April 16, 1991. Accordingly, a second issue was whether ser-
vice was in compliance with Swiss law.2 The last issue was whether
service made in compliance with South Carolina law was sufficient. On
certified questions presented from federal district court, The Supreme
Court of South Carolina Held: Questions Answered. (1) Service of pro-
cess on foreign corporation not registered to conduct business in state
was effective upon delivery of the S&C to the Secretary of State under
§ 15-9-245; (2) service upon foreign corporation was in compliance with
Swiss law; and (3) process made in compliance with South Carolina
law would not have deprived South Carolina courts of jurisdiction even
if service of process failed to comply with Swiss law. When construing
statutes similar to the one at issue, The Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina has held that service of process is effected when the designated
agent is served.3 Similarly, the United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina has held service under § 15-9-245 to be effec-
tive upon the delivery of suit papers to the Secretary of State."4 This
conforms with the general rule that service upon a designated agent is
permissible, and personal service upon the defendant is unnecessary. In
its discussion of the second and third questions presented, the court
1. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-9-245 states in part:
a) Every foreign corporation which is not authorized to do business in this
State... is considered to have designated the Secretary of State as its agent
upon whom process may be served in any action or proceeding arising in any
court in this state...
(b) Service of the process is made by delivering to and leaving with the Secre-
tary of State... duplicate copies of the process .... The Secretary of State
immediately shall cause one of the copies to be forwarded by certified mail,
addressed to the corporation...
2. The Swiss law is based upon the position that any act touching Switzerland,
including mailing of service into Switzerland from the U.S. is viewed by Switzerland as
a judicial act by the United States, thereby invading Swiss Sovereignty.
3. See Ballenger Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Reach-All Sales, Inc., 276 S.C.
394, 279 S.E.2d 127, 128 (1981).
4. See Hammond v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 128 F.R.D. 638 (D.S.C. 1989).
SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
urged that the only relevant question is the sufficiency of process under
United States laws. The court stressed that the law of the forum regu-
lates matters relating to process, as well as its nature and effect. More-
over, the court reasoned that complete frustration results from a for-
eign country's objection to American methods of service and the
resulting refusal to enforce American judgement and not from failure
to effect personal service. Significance: As per the forum's law, service
of process upon a foreign corporation is effective upon the delivery of
the S&C to the statutorily designated Secretary of State.
VI. ZONING
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH ORGANIZATION Is NOT EXEMPT FROM
COUNTY ZONING REGULATIONS PROHIBITING PRIVATE BUSINESSES IN
RESIDENTIAL AREAS WHICH THE COUNTY WAS AUTHORIZED TO EN-
ACT. Pan American Health Organization v. Montgomery County, 338
Md. 214 (1995).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit sent
the following certified question to the Maryland Court of Appeals:
Whether the County Council for Montgomery County, sit-
ting as the District Council, had the authority under state law
to enact zoning legislation that had the effect of prohibiting the
Pan American Health Organization ("PAHO") from locating
its headquarters in a residentially-zoned area in Montgomery
County.
The Plaintiff, PAHO, is an international health organization.
PAHO wanted to re-locate its national headquarters from Washington,
D.C., to residentially zoned property in Chevy Chase, Maryland.
PAHO believed it could relocate to this area, despite the residential
zoning status, because it qualified as a "public" organization that could
be exempt from zoning regulations. The Defendants, Montgomery
County, Maryland, and the County Council for Mongtomery County,
Maryland, did not believe that PAHO was exempt from the zoning
requirements. The Fourth Circuit case ensued from this dispute.
On certified question to the Maryland Court of Appeals, Held:
Certified question answered in the affirmative. Local governments are
authorized to promulgate zoning regulations which prevent businesses
from locating in residential areas. International organizations are not
necessarily exempt from such zoning regulations.
Regarding the certified question, PAHO first argued that Mont-
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gomery County does not have the power to regulate public interna-
tional organizations because these organizations are not specifically
mentioned in the Regional District Act. The Court of Appeals dis-
agreed. The Court ruled that the Regional District Act, codified in Ar-
ticle 28, §8-101 of the Maryland Code, expressly delegates the State's
zoning powers to the counties. This Act does not mention any specific
organization - if public international organizations are exempt be-
cause they are not mentioned in the Act, then every organization would
be exempt. The PAHO attempted to counter this argument by assert-
ing that it was a State governmental organization. PAHO argued that
the State is not subject to its own enactments unless there is proof of
clear intent to be bound by them. Though this common law principle is
true, the Court did not agree that the principle applied in this case as
PAHO is in no way part of or derived from the government of the
State of Maryland.
Secondly, PAHO argued that its organization is "public" and is
therefore exempt from county zoning regulations. Again, the Court dis-
agreed, holding that PAHO is not public, despite its designation as a
"public international organization" under the International Organiza-
tions Immunities Act (IOIA). The Court held that the IOIA definition
does not apply to zoning regulations, and that PAHO is not public be-
cause it is not a governmental board, body or official, which are the
only entities given the "public" label under Article 28, § 7-112. In
sum, the Court found that neither of PAHO's arguments were suffi-
cient to answer the certified question in its favor. The Court ruled that
the County Council for Montgomery County did have the authority
under Maryland law to enact zoning legislation that prohibited PAHO
from locating its headquarters in a residentially zoned area in Mont-
gomery County. Significance: International organizations are not neces-
sarily exempt from local zoning laws and do not have the authority to
bypass these laws when locating their places of business.
